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Abstract
The regulatory scheme mentioned is the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA)passed by
the Parliament of Canada in December 1973. The FIRA was a response to a growing nationalist
feeling in the early 1970’s, from which developed a resentment of the seeming omnipresence
of foreign business in the Canadian economy and a fear of the long-term consequences of such
presence. In examining the FIRA, this Note will explore the factors that led to passage of the
legislation. The Act will be analyzed in depth. Important statutory language will be defined and
explained, and the review process of the FIRA will be outlined. Finally, the Note will discuss the
success of the FIRA and consider its effect on investment in Canada.

CANADA'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT
REVIEW ACT REVISITED
INTRODUCTION
The United States has long enjoyed a trade relationship of significant volume with Canada. 1 A large portion of United States investment in Canada is "direct investment," involving a significant
share in ownership of a Canadian business rather than a mere portfolio investment. 2 Certain foreign direct investment has been subjected to Canadian governmental regulation since 1974. This
regulatory scheme must be adhered to: failure to comply with it
could lead to nullification of a transaction 3 and/or a fine of
Can$5,000, 4 regardless of innocent intent or ignorance of the
regulatory requirements.
The regulatory scheme mentioned above is the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), 5 passed by the Parliament of Canada
in December 1973. The FIRA was a response to a growing nationalist feeling in the early 1970's, from which developed a resentment of the seeming omnipresence of foreign business in the Canadian economy and a fear of the long-term consequences of such
presence.

6

The passage of the FIRA sparked much controversy among
Canada's trading partners. 7 Precisely what effect the Act would
1. See Gherson, U.S. Investment in Canada, FOR. INV. REV., Spring 1980, at 11.
2. Grover, FIRA: In A Nutshell, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BuSINESS IN CANADA 10 (A.B.A. 1976).

3. See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 105 infra. A Canadian dollar, it should be noted, is worth approximately 0.85 American dollars. All references to dollars are Canadian dollars unless
otherwise indicated.
5. Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973-74 Can. Stat., c. 46, as amended by
1976-77 Can. Stat., c. 52 [hereinafter cited as FIRA]. See generally G. HUGHES, A
COMMENTARY ON THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT (1975); J. LANGFORD,
CANADIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONTROLS (1974); Donaldson & Jackson, The For-

eign Investment Review Act: An Analysis Of The Legislation,.53 CAN. BAR REV. 171
(1975).
6. See notes 27-38 infra and accompanying text.
7. The legislation drew an angry reaction from investors in the United States,
Canada's number one trading partner. See, e.g., Murray, FIRA: Its Origin And Purposes, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 3, 5 (A.B.A.
1976).
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have on hitherto profitable trading relationships was not known at
that time. Canadians also questioned the efficacy of the FIRA.
Some felt that the Act should have gone further;8 others would have
preferred that no restraint at all be placed on foreign investment.9
Although several years have elapsed since the passage of the
FIRA, its success is still uncertain. A special five-year report issued
in 1979 could not conclusively claim that administration of the
FIRA has resulted in solving any of the problems focused upon in
1973.10
In examining the FIRA, this Note will explore the factors that
led to passage of the legislation. The Act will be analyzed in depth.
Important statutory language will be defined and explained, and
the review process of the FIRA will be outlined. Finally, the Note
will discuss the success of the FIRA and consider its effect on investment in Canada.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE FIRA

Observation of the people and government of Canada reveals
that throughout their history, the Canadians have had to struggle
to keep up a national identity." Dwarfed by a powerful neighbor
to the south and heavily dependent upon foreign investment to
sustain its economy, 12 Canada has longed for the capacity to set its
own course and lessen its dependency on political and business decisions made in other countries. Although Canada realizes the need
for foreign capital, arguments have been made for twenty years favoring regulation of foreign participation in Canadian economy. 13

8. See, e.g., G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 3 n.3.
9. See, e.g., Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 5, at 213 n.93. Opposition came
from the poorer provinces of Canada, whose economies were not capable of developing without significant input of foreign capital. Id.
10. [1978-79] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. (Supp. 1979). See notes 129-49
infra and accompanying text.
11. Wahn, Toward Canadian Identity-The Significance of Foreign Investment, 11 OSGOODE L.J. 517, 519-24 (1973).
12. G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 5; see notes 19-22 infra and accompanying
text.
13. Several government reports called for a reappraisal of Canada's foreign investment policy. GOV'T OF CAN., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Gray Report]; GOV'T OF CAN., ELEVENTH REPORT OF THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL

DEFENCE RESPECTING CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS (1970); GOV'T OF CAN., FOREIGN
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Until the 1970's, however, no regulations of broad scope were
set up. The legislation which was enacted 14 utilized (1) the "key
sector" approach, restricting foreign participation in a particular activity which the government deemed important,' 5 (2) the "fixed
rules" approach, requiring a defined minimum of Canadian participation in any enterprise undertaken by foreign investors' 6 or (3) a
7
mixture of the two.'
By 1972, public support for broad investment controls was apparent. 8 The level of foreign capital in Canada, however, had already become substantial. More importantly, almost half of the foreign investment in Canada was "direct investment." 19 It was
estimated in 1970 that one-third of the business activity in Canada
was undertaken by foreign-controlled enterprises. 2 0 In some industries, such as the petroleum and rubber products industries, Canadian ownership was almost non-existent as foreign control exceeded
ninety per cent. 2 ' Over three-fourths of this control was held by
22
United States investors.
OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY (1968); GOV'T OF CAN.,
REPORT ON CANADA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS (1958).
14. See, e.g., G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 9-10; FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY PAPERS No. 2, SELECTED READINGS IN CANADIAN LEGISLATION AFFECTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1977) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED READINGS].

15. See, e.g., Direction to Canadian Radio-Television Commission pursuant to §
27 of Broadcasting Act, 1967-68 Can. Stat., c. 25 (current version at CAN. REV. STAT.
c. B-11, § 27 (1970)), under which a license to operate a broadcasting station can
only be granted to a Canadian citizen or corporation of which the entire board of directors is Canadian.
16. See, e.g., Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, CAN. REV. STAT.
c. 31, § 6(3) (1952) (current version at CAN. REV. STAT. C. 1-15, § 6(4) (1970)), under
which a majority of the board of directors of a federally incorporated insurance corporation must be Canadian citizens ordinarily resident in Canada.
17. See, e.g., Canada Mining Regulations, STAT. 0. & R. 61-86, as amended by
STAT. 0. & R. 62-249 and STAT. 0. & R. 66-80, under which mining leases in the
northwestern provinces can only be granted to a Canadian citizen or corporation,
or to a foreign corporation that allows significant Canadian participation in its operation. See also SELECTED READINGS, supra note 14, at 121.
18. A public opinion poll taken in February 1972 showed that 69% of Canadians favored the establishment of some sort of screening agency for foreign investment. McMillan, After the Gray Report: The Tortuous Evolution of Foreign Investment Policy, 20 McGILL L.J. 213, 260 n.147 (1974).
19. See text accompanying note 2 supra for a definition of direct investment.
20. G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 5.
21. Id.
22. This was significant as some Canadians feared that the pervasive presence
of the United States in the Canadian economy might lead to some form of political
integration. One U.S. author commented on this possibility:
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Foreign Investment Behavior

For many years after World War II, foreign investors in Canada evinced a strong preference for direct investment.2 3 Encouraged by the lure of a wide-open market and a high Canadian
tariff,2 4 and desirous of Canada's rich supply of natural resources
and raw materials, large numbers of multinational corporations entered the Canadian business scene. Rather than moderate the on25
slaught, the Canadian government took on a carte blanche policy.
The rapid influx of capital clearly benefited Canada at first,
helping industries get off to a start, increasing the production of
goods and creating jobs for the local populace. 2 6 Negative repercussions, however, did exist. First, domination by parent
companies led to a "branch-plant"2 7 economy, in which the Canadian subsidiary did not develop into a self-sufficient entity. Foreign
parent corporations generally limited Canadian participation in the
operations of the subsidiary. The parent performed functions from
marketing to research and development while the subsidiary simply supplied the local market. 28 Any innovations in the production
process came from the operations center, not from the Canadian
plant. Because all the planning and decision-making took place outside Canada, no native expertise developed in marketing, manage-

Canada, I have long believed, is fighting a rearguard action against the inevitable .... [C]ountries with economies so inextricably intertwined must also
have free movement of the other vital factors of production-capital, services
and labour. The result will inevitably be substantial economic integration,
which will require for its full realization a progressively expanding area of
common political decision.
C. BALL, THE DISCIPLINE OF POWER 113 (1968), quoted in Wahn, supra note 11, at
521.
23. See Franck & Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign Investment Control Experiment:
The Law, the Context And The Practice, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 85-86 (1975).
24. G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 6. Given the presence of a high tariff, it is advantageous for a foreign company, if economically feasible, to incorporate a separate
subsidiary in the host country. The products of that subsidiary will then benefit from
the protection of the tariff and the parent company will benefit by having direct access to the host market and thus avoid the tariff.
25. Fulford, Canada Wants Out (of the United States), N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,
1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 19.
26. Note, The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act: Red, White, And
Gray, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1018, 1022 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Red, White
and Gray].
27. Id. at 1022-23.
28. Id. at 1024.
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ment or technology. 2 9 This perpetuated Canadian dependence
upon foreign investment.
A second major problem caused by the dominance of
multinationals was that product differentiation was based not on
what was appropriate for the Canadian market but on what was appropriate for the parent country's market. 30 Because Canada was
supplied with a greater variety of products than fit her demand, in31
efficient "miniature replica" markets resulted.
Another difficulty was caused by the extraterritorial impact of
the multinational's native laws on the Canadian subsidiary. Any
subsidiaries controlled by United States interests had to abide by
the Trading With The Enemy Act,3 2 which restricts trading with
nations hostile to the United States. Thus, Canadian companies
were forced to forego profitable trade relationships.
Foreign domination caused other problems as well. Multinationals often limited exports of the subsidiary, in order to avoid
direct competition with the subsidiary. 3 3 Subsidiaries provided parent companies with raw materials, but participated no further in
production: the parent would process the materials outside Canada
into finished goods. 34 Transactions with subsidiaries were not at
arms length but rather were on terms advantageous to the parent
company. This often resulted in a loss of tax revenue for the Canadian government. 35 Finally, due to the prohibition or limitations
placed by most foreign-controlling companies on Canadian equity
participation in the subsidiaries, Canadian capital was forced out of
Canada. 36
29. Note, Canada's Changing Posture Toward Multinational Corporations:An
Attempt To Harmonize Nationalism With Continued Industrial Growth, 7 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 271, 274-75 (1974) [hereinafter cited as An Attempt To Harmonize].
30. Red, White, And Gray, supra note 26, at 1023-24.
31. Id. at 1023.
32. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1-44 (1976). For example, a U.S. controlled firm in
Montreal was almost prevented from accepting a lucrative export order from Cuba to
manufacture and sell 25 locomotives. The sale went through only after negotiations
took place between the U.S. and Canadian governments. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1974, at
A3, col. 3.
33. English, Foreign Investment in Manufacturing, in CANADA-UNITED
STATES REGULATIONS 88, 89 (H. English ed. 1976).
34. G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 6. One source reported that "[flor most Western industrialized countries, end products constitute approximately 60% of exports,
but for Canada the ratio is only 19%." Franck & Gudgeon, supra note 23, at 90.
35. English, supra note 33, at 89.
36. Wahn, supra note 11, at 533. Because of the restriction on Canadian partici-
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In addition to these drawbacks, developments in the scope of
direct foreign investment forced Canadians to reconsider their
welcoming policy. First, the growth of foreign controlled firms was
financed less and less by "fresh" capital. Beginning in the 1960's, a
higher proportion of foreign funding came from the retained earnings of the Canadian subsidiaries and from money borrowed from
Canadian sources;3 7 foreign capitalists dipped less into their home
sources of capital to finance their Canadian operations. Therefore,
Canadian capital became the major capital source for foreign
controlled firms. A second, contemporaneous development was
that foreign companies began to enter the market by purchasing
control of already existing Canadian companies, rather than by
38
initiating new operations.
Eventually, many Canadians began to doubt that there was
any net economic gain from foreign direct investment. Under the
tide of nationalism of the early 1970's, a clamor arose for legislative
action to limit foreign exploitation and develop a more autonomous
economy. 3 9 A broad legislative scheme, inspired by the Gray Report40 and first introduced in the House of Commons in May
1972, 4 1 passed in December 1973 as the Foreign Investment Review Act.
pation, almost half of the largest corporations in Canada did not have their shares
available on the market. Shecter, FIRA: Experiences Of A U.S. Lawyer, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 38 (A.B.A. 1976). This resulted in a "vicious cycle." Canadian capital often went into U.S. companies which
then used such capital for investment in Canada, sometimes direct investment. Id.
37. C. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 7.
38. Id.
39. Alistair Gillespie, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, called for
Canada to become more than an "appendage" of foreign corporate giants south of
the border. He warned:
We have become too accustomed to expecting others to do our research,
product innovation and market development and too accustomed to others
telling us what we might do. The degree of foreign control has dulled or inhibited entrepeneurship in Canada by Canadians in Canadian firms ....
If
we continue to rely so heavily on others . . . we turn over the future development of Canada to [foreign control].
N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at A14, col. 2.
40. Gray Report, supra note 13.
41. Grover, The Foreign Investment Review Act: Phase 1, 1 CAN. Bus. L.J. 54,
56 (1975). The original bill was entitled the Foreign Takeovers Review Act. Id. Certain amendments had to be made before it passed. E.g., a provision was added providing for consultation with provincial governments. Gualtieri, Canada's New Foreign Investment Policy, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 46, 53 (1975).
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II. PROVISIONS OF THE FIRA
The Foreign Investment Review Act came into force on April
9, 1974.42 The Act created the Foreign Investment Review Agency
and provides that a "non-eligible" person (NEP)4 3 proposing any of
three types of investment in Canada must receive government approval of his proposal before going ahead with the investment.
The three types of investment are: (1) acquisition of control of
a "Canadian business enterprise," 4 (2) expansion of an existing
5
business of an NEP in Canada into an unrelated line of business,4
(3) establishment of a new business by a NEP who has not carried
on a business in Canada. 4 6 The provisions of the FIRA regulating
investments of type (2) and (3) did not come into force until October 15, 1975, so that the Review Agency could have time to gain
47
experience in processing applications.
The FIRA provides that any NEP or group a member of which
is an NEP may not engage in any of these three types of investment unless upon application to the Review Agency he can show
that his investment will be of significant benefit to Canada. 48 The
FIRA must be read carefully as the definitions of "non-eligible person," "Canadian business enterprise," "acquisition of control," and
"related business" are complex. An investor not properly familiar
with these terms could be subject to review without even knowing it.
42. See Grover, supra note 41, at 56.
43. See notes 49-57 infra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of when businesses are "related" for purposes of the
FIRA, see notes 70-79 infra and accompanying text.
46. G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 13. The FIRA is not retroactive. FIRA, supra
note 5, § 5(1). Nor does it regulate the operation of existing foreign-controlled firms,
which the Gray Report, supra note 13, had suggested. G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at
12. According to Garse Howarth, the Review Agency Commissioner from 1975-77,
"the government had no desire to change the rules in midstream." Howarth, Foreign
Investment Review Act Not Material Change in Attitude, American Banker, Mar. 12,
1976, at 4, col. 1.
47. Gualtieri, supra note 41, at 53. While the first phase of the FLRA was in effect, acquisition of control of a business with gross assets of $250,000 or less and
gross annual revenue of $3,000,000 or less were exempted from review. FIRA,supra
note 5, § 5(1)(c). When the second phase of the Act went into effect, bringing "new
business" investments under review, most of the exemption disappeared. An acquisition may still be exempted from the FIRA if the acquired business is smaller than
the old threshold and is related to a business already carried on in Canada by the
acquiring party. FIRA,supra note 5, § 31(3).
48. FIRA,supra note 5, § 2(1).
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A. Non-Eligible Persons
The threshold question a party must ask is whether he is a
non-eligible person. If the individual investor or investment group
falls outside the statutory definition of non-eligible person, none of
the other aspects of the FIRA are applicable. The investment proposal can then be implemented without going through the review
process.
Non-eligible persons 49 include: (1) Canadian citizens not ordinarily resident in Canada; 50 (2) landed immigrants 51 who have been
eligible to apply for citizenship for more than one year52 and who
have not made such application; (3) individuals who are neither Canadian citizens nor permanent residents; (4) foreign governments
or their agencies; and (5) corporations incorporated in Canada or
elsewhere5 3 that are controlled in fact 54 by an NEP or by a group
55
of persons, any member of which is an NEP, who act in concert.
49. Id. § 3(1).
50. For the determination of which Canadian citizens are NEP's, see Foreign
Investment Review Regulation§, P.C. 1977-606, as amended by P.C. 1978-2309
[hereinafter cited as Regulations]; § 3(1)(B).
51. See Immigration Act, 1976-77 Can. Stat., c. 52, § 2(1).
52. Eligibility for citizenship is .set forth in the Citizenship Act, 1974-75-76
Can. Stat., c. 108, § 5(1).
53. Note that a corporation incorporated outside Canada is not irrebuttably presumed to be an NEP. E.g., a foreign corporation that is controlled by Canadians may
not be an NEP.
54. Control in fact may be effected directly, or indirectly, e.g., through a voting
trust or management contract. See Gualtieri, supra note 41, at 57.
55. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(1). It is important to note that language of "control
in fact" is used only for determining whether individual corporations are NEP's.
Where a group of unincorporated organizations or individuals join together or where
two corporations plan a joint venture, FIRA §§ 8(1), 8(2) call for review when any
one of the members of the group is an NEP. Even where the group is controlled in
fact by an eligible party, it will be tainted by the NEP member and must apply for
review. See Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 5, at 223; Note, After Two Years: Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act, 3 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 163, 166-67
n.32 (1978) [hereinafter cited as After Two Years].
FIRA § 3(2) sets forth presumptions to indicate when an individual corporation
is an NEP. Where 25% of the voting shares of a public corporation are held by
NEP's or by foreign corporations, or where 40% of the voting shares of a closed corporation are so held, the corporation is rebuttably presumed to be an NEP. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(2)(a). Where 5% of the voting shares of a corporation, either public or
closed, are held by one individual NEP or foreign corporation, the same presumption arises. Id. § 3(2)(b). For presumptions to be applied when control in fact of a
corporation rests with a group consisting of both NEP's and eligible persons, see
FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(6)(b.1). Where no person or group controls a corporation, or
where the corporation does not have share capital, then the board of directors is
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A party proposing an investment may apply to the Minister of
Industry, Trade and Commerce for a formal opinion, after investigation, as to whether he is an NEP. 56 This opinion is binding on
the Minister for two years provided that material facts disclosed to
him during investigation remain substantially unchanged. 5 7
B.

Canadian Business Enterprise

If it has been determined that the investor is an NEP, then he
will be subject to the review process if he is proposing to acquire
control of a Canadian business enterprise. If the target business
does not come within the statutory definition then the FIRA may
not be applicable.
A Canadian business enterprise is defined as being either a
"Canadian branch business" 58 or a "Canadian business." 59 A "business" is any enterprise carried on in anticipation of a profit.6 0
deemed to have control. Id. § 3(7)(b). The composition of the board, NEP's or eligible persons, shall then be applied to presumptions set out in FIRA § 3( 7 )(c) to determine whether the corporation itself is an NEP.
It should be remembered that the presumptions are not the only indicator.
"Control in fact" may be indicated by past commercial and legal relationships of the
corporation. Also, holdings by NEP's of less than 5%, 25%, or 40% may still cause a
corporation to be ruled an NEP. See G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 18-19; Franck &
Gudgeon, supra note 23, at 116. It should also be noted that the presumptions do not
apply to holdings by a Canadian corporation. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(2)(a).
56. FIRA, supra note 5, § 4(1). The Minister is required to give an opinion on
this matter upon request. GOV'T OF CAN., FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY, BUSINESSMAN'S
GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT 11.

57. FIRA, supra note 5, § 4(1). The investor, however, is not bound by this
opinion. Id.
58. Id. § 3(1). A "Canadian branch buisness" is a business carried on by a foreign corporation that maintains one or more establishments in Canada to which employees of the corporation ordinarily report for work. Id. Businesses carried on by
foreign individuals as proprietorships or partnerships are not "Canadian branch businesses" and may be exempted from coverage of the FIRA provided that the foreigner
is not ordinarily resident in Canada. See G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 25.
59. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(1). A "Canadian business" is a business carried on
in Canada by a Canadian corporation or an individual who is either a Canadian citizen or ordinarily resident in Canada, or by any combination in which one of such
parties is in a position to control the conduct of the business. Id. If the business is a
corporation, there must be an establishment similar to the one required of a branch
business. See note 58 supra.
60. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(1). Section 5(1) of the Act exempts some enterprises from its operation. These firms, most of which are held partly by the federal
government, are listed in Schedule D of the Financial Administration Act, CAN. REV.
STAT. c. F-10 (1970), or § 149(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1970-71-72 Can. Stat., c.
63. Also excluded from consideration as a "business" is certain real estate property.
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Firms which do not at first glance fit within any of the definitions
of a Canadian business enterprise may still be subject to the
6
FIRA. '
C. Acquisition of Control
If the investment target is a Canadian business enterprise,
then the NEP should ask whether as a result of his proposal he will
acquire control of the business. If control is not acquired, the investment is regarded as a mere portfolio investment and the FIRA
does not apply.
"Acquisition of control" is defined more narrowly than "control
in fact" under the NEP test. 62 A person can acquire control of a
Canadian business enterprise only by acquiring voting shares or
63
substantially all of the property used in carrying on the business.
If an investor plans to acquire stock of a Canadian corporation,
the provisions of sections 3(3)(c) and (d) of the FIRA should be
consulted to ascertain whether control has been acquired. 6 4 Acquisition of stock of a foreign corporation may also come under those
provisions. It has been argued that acquisition of shares of a foreign

FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(9). For determination of what real estate activity does constitute a business, see Guidelines Concerning Real Estate Businesses. See also Grover,
supra note 41, at 92-95, especially at 94.
61. E.g., FIRA § 3(6)(g) provides that a part of a Canadian business enterprise
that is capable of being carried on as a separate business is itself considered to be a
Canadian business enterprise. Id. FIRA § 3(6)(h) is even more far-reaching. It provides that a business carried on by a corporation, which corporation is controlled in
fact by another corporation, is deemed to be carried on by the controlling corporation
as well as by the controlled corporation. Id. See notes 65, 122 infra and accompanying text.
62. See Gualtieri, supra note 41, at 57. "Control in fact" by an NEP may be exercised by any means whatsoever. See note 54 supra.
63. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(3)(a). Two items should be remembered. First, acquisition of a leasehold interest in business property is considered to be an acquisition of that property. Id. § 3(6)(e). Second, under § 3(6)(g), see note 61 supra, acquisition of an important business property, though not "substantially all" of the business
property of the established business, could constitute acquistion of control of a business, reviewable under the Act.
"Business property" may include items such as trademarks and goodwill, in addition to physical assets. See Guidelines Concerning Real Estate Businesses 11 §
1(a).
64. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(3)(c), (d). Acquisition of more than 5% of the voting
shares of a corporartion, or more than 20% if the shares are not publicly traded, is
rebuttably presumed to be acquisition of control. Id. § 3(3)(c). When more than 50%
of the voting shares are acquired, control is deemed irrebuttably to have been acquired. Id. § 3(3)(d).
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corporation might possibly constitute acquisition of control of a Ca65
nadian branch carried on by that corporation.
If a Canadian business enterprise is carried on in noncorporate form, control may be obtained only through acquisition
of business property. Unfortunately, there is no definition of what
is "substantially all" of business property.
The FIRA is not retroactive. 66 Therefore, a transaction by a
party who had control before 1974, which merely extends his control further, is not reviewable. Similarly, control acquired after
1974, through the review process, may be extended further without a second review. 6 7 Other transactions involving significant ac68
quisitions are also exempted from the FIRA.
The FIRA makes special provisions for persons who acquire
options or other contractual rights to acquire property or shares.
Acquisition of such rights, where not given as loan security, is
treated as a present acquisition of the property or shares, and may
69
be a reviewable transaction.
65. The provisions on acquisition of shares refer to Canadian businesses, not to
Canadian branch businesses. Id. § 3(3)(a)(i). See notes 58-59 supra. So control of a
branch business may be acquired only through acquisition of business property. If
the subsidiary is incorporated in Canada, however, the foreign parent might be
deemed to be a Canadian business, through application of the presumption in FIRA
§ 3(6)(h). See note 61 supra. Acquisition of shares of a foreign corporation could then
be subject to review under the Act. Whether this reading is correct would depend
upon whether the Parliament intended the FIRA to have an extraterritorial impact.
For argument that such impact is not provided for under the FIRA, see G. HUGHES,
supra note 5, at 27-29. See also note 122 infra; Grover, supra note 41, at 69-70;
Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 5, at 220-21.
66. See note 46 supra.
67. Any transaction prior to which the purchaser already had control in fact is
not reviewable. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(3)(d).
68. Corporate reorganizations which do not result in a change of ultimate control of a business are not reviewable. Id. § 3(3)(e). See Guidelines Concerning Corporate Reorganizations.
Acquisitions of stock by a venture capitalist are not reviewable. The venture capitalist, however, is closely regulated by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce and may be compelled to follow a divestiture schedule. For qualifications required of a venture capitalist, see Terms and Conditions for the Venture Capital
Exemption, § 2. Acquisitions of control, taken as security for a loan, and acquisition
of shares by a securities dealer in the ordinary course of his business do not require
approval under the Act. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(3)(b)(ii), (iv).
69. FIRA, supra note 5, § 3(6)(c). If the right is contingent upon the death of an
individual, review is not required until exercise of the right, i.e., upon the individual's death. Id. § 3(6)(c)(ii). Thus a person who devises or bequeaths property used in
a Canadian business enterprise or shares of a Canadian business cannot be sure
whether his intent will be carried out, if the beneficiaries are NEP's. This problem
exists, of course, only if the "control" element is present.
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Related Business

If an NEP proposes to establish a new business in Canada, he
may or may not have to go through the review process.
The establishment by NEP's of a new business in Canada after
October 15, 1975, is generally a reviewable transaction. 70 If the
new business is related to a business already carried on by the
NEP in Canada, however, no approval is needed. 7 1 While the
FIRA does not state when two businesses are "'related," the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce has set forth guidelines for
such determination. 72 In addition, an investor may require the
Minister to issue an opinion on whether the proposed new busi73
ness is related to the older business.
Under the Guidelines issued by the Minister, relatedness is
found where there is vertical or horizontal integration between two
businesses, 74 or where the product or productive process of the
new business resulted largely from research and development
carried on in Canada by or for the established business. 75 The definitions of relatedness listed in the Guidelines are not exclusive. 7 6
The definitions of relatedness are quite broad. 77 This is due to
deliberate government policy 78 to encourage expanding multinationals to pursue all facets of the business process in Canada, to

70. Id. § 8(2). See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
71. FIRA, supra note 5, § 8(2)(b).
72. See Guidelines Concerning Related Business. The first determination
should be whether there is a new business at all, or an expansion of an existing business. See id. § 3(1).
73. FIRA, supra note 5, § 4(1). The effect and duration of this opinion are the
same as that for the opinion on when an investor is an NEP. See note 56-57 supra
and accompanying text.
74. See Guidelines Concerning Related Business, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, 4. For example, if the output of the new business is to be used as service, input, or capital for
activities of the established business, the new business may be deemed related to
the existing business. Id. Guideline 1(a).
75. Id. Guideline 5.
76. Guidelines Concerning Related Business § 4.
77. One commentator has said that the relatedness requirement is practically
meaningless, as many of the multinational corporations in Canada have already diversified. I.e., for a corporation participating in several different types of business, a
wide range of activities would be "related" to its existing operations. An Attempt To
Harmonize, supra note 29, at 298.
78. The Gray Report recommended a bias in favor of allowing new investment,
and against takeovers. Grover, supra note 41, at 95 n.180.
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utilize-and develop-native Canadian ingenuity more than they
79
had in the past.
E.

Significant Benefit

If it is finally determined that an NEP's investment proposal is
subject to review, the NEP must then present the proposal as one
that will bring significant benefit to Canada. Section 2(1) of the
FIRA provides that no reviewable investment by an NEP shall be
approved unless the NEP can show that the investment is likely to
be of significant benefit to Canada. This is an affirmative burden on
the investor. A showing of no detriment, that no one shall be
harmed by the investment, will not sustain the investor's burden.
He must show more than the mere fact that the status quo will not
be disturbed. 80
The FIRA sets forth several factors which can be considered in
81
determining whether a proposal will produce significant benefit.
These factors are not always given the same weight, nor must all
79. Not all the Guideline definitions provide this encouragement. The research
and development Category, however, certainly does. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
80. For example, a proposal was disallowed in 1974-75 because "the applicant's
plans . . . did not seem much different from the course of development that the company could be expected to achieve under its existing ownership .... " [1974-75] FOR.
INV. REV. AcENCY ANN. REP. 10-11.
81. FIRA, supra note 5, § 2(2). These factors are:
(a) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of
economic activity in Canada, including ... the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts, components and services produced in Canada, and on exports from Canada; (b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business enterprise . . . and in
any industry or industries in Canada of which the business enterprise . . .
would form a part; (c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product innovation and product variety in Canada; (d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any . . . industries in Canada; and (e) the
compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national industrial and
economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy
objectives enunciated by . . . any province likely to be significantly affected
by the acquisition or establishment.
Other factors have been looked to under the practice of the Review Agency.
These include whether there is a Canadian bidding against the NEP; how the seller
of an acquired business plans to dispose of the proceeds; whether the seller is currently Canadian-controlled or foreign-controlled. See Donaldson & Jackson, supra
note 5, at 209; Grover, supra note 41, at 86, 95 n.179; After Two Years, supra note
55, at 181.

188

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:175

factors be considered in every investment review.8 2 In fact, the
test of significant benefit is so vague that decisions may be made
84
83
on almost any basis whatsoever -including a political basis.
Since the test is not a clear-cut one, the review process is
turned into more of a negotiating session between the government
and the investor, rather than a rigid application of rules. Under the
FIRA, then, Canada has a chance to shape what benefits it can expect from a given investment proposal.
III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRA
A.

The Review Agency

The administrative agency of the FIRA is the Foreign Investment Review Agency, created by section 7 of the Act. While some
proponents of the original bill had intended the Agency to be an
independent tribunal, 8 5 the role of the Agency under the Act as
passed is to assist the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce.
The Agency reviews applications of investment proposals and gives
a report of its findings, with its recommendation for allowance or
disallowance, to the Minister. The Minister then makes a recommendation to the Federal Cabinet. The Cabinet makes the ultimate decision whether to allow or disallow the investment; it is not
86
bound by the Minister's recommendation.
82. GOV'T OF CAN., FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY, BUSINESSMAN'S GUIDE TO THE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT 10.

83. It has been suggested that "these factors mean just what the Cabinet ...
says they mean. They are sufficiently broad to enable almost any policy approach to
be taken to future foreign investment ... [e.g.,] the key sector approach or the fixed
rules approach." G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 61. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
84. Affected provinces have a say in the review process. See FIRA, supra note
5, § 2(2); note 81 supra. Therefore, potential investors may wish to enlist the aid of
provincial representatives before going to the Review Agency. If provincial representatives apply any measure of pressure on the government to allow a proposal, it is
more likely to be approved. See Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 5, at 213-14.
85. The Gray Report suggested that the Review Agency be the ultimate decision maker. Grover, supra note 41, at 58. The Parliament did not want to give
unreined power to a tribunal of bureaucrats, however. Indeed, J. Richard Murray,
the first Commissioner of the Review Agency, was quick to point out in an interview
in 1974 that the Agency was not at all like the powerful U.S. regulatory agencies, but
rather had less real power. Borders, CanadianAide to Study Foreign Investing, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1974, at 55, col. 1.
86. FIRA, supra note 5, § 12. References to "Governor in Council" relate to the
Federal Cabinet. For length of the review process, see note 95 infra.
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The Minister, when requested, must issue opinions on
whether an investor is a non-eligible person or whether a proposed
new business will be related to a business already carried on in
Canada.8 7 The Minister may also issue guidelines88 which aid in interpretation of the FIRA but which do not have the force of law.89
Agency opinions may also be issued, although they are not
specifically authorized by the FIRA or binding on the Minister.90
Agency opinions frequently respond to questions such as whether
an acquisition of control has taken place, whether a property to be
purchased is a business enterprise, l or whether assets being acquired constitute substantially all the business property of a Cana92
dian business enterprise.
B.

Notices

Every NEP investor or investment group that is proposing an
investment covered by the FIRA is required to give notice to the
Review Agency. 9 In addition to outlining the investor's plans for
the business, this notice must supply a vast amount of confidential
information about both the investor and the seller (if there is a
seller),9 4 and requires a significant amount of time and effort both

87. FIRA, supra note 5, § 4. See notes 56-57, 73 supra and accompanying text.
88. FIRA, supra note 5, § 4(2).
89. See, e.g., Guidelines Concerning Real Estate Business, introductory para.
To date the Minister has issued five guidelines: (1) Guidelines Concerning Real Estate Business (1974); (2) Terms and Conditions for the Venture Capital Exemption
(1974); (3) Guidelines Concerning Corporate Reorganizations (1975, 1977); (4)
Guidelines Concerning Related Business (1975, 1977); (5) Guidelines Concerning
Acquisitions of Interests in Oil and Gas Rights (1976). The Federal Cabinet is empowered to issue regulations. FIRA, supra note 5, § 28. Regulations setting forth notice requirements and providing for certain information to be supplied upon application to the Review Agency have been issued. Regulations, supra note 50. Unlike the
Minister's guidelines, the Regulations have the force of law. See After Two Years,
supra note 55, at 171 n.84.
90. GOV'T OF CAN., FOR. INV. REV AGENCY, A GUIDE TO FILING NOTICE WITH
THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AGENCY 4.
91. See note 63 supra.
92. GOV'T OF CAN., FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY, A GUIDE TO FILING NOTICE
WITH THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AGENCY 3. In addition to Agency rulings,
employees in the Rulings Division of the Compliance Branch of the Review Agency
will discuss application of the FIRA and provide verbal, no-names interpretations if
requested. Simon, FIRA Procedures: Clarifying Some Legal Issues, FOR. INV. REV.,
Autumn 1978, at 13.
93. FIRA, supra note 5, § 8.
94. E.g., an investor must provide the Review Agency with a complete descrip-
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in drawing up the notice and in Agency review of the notice. Since
1977, however, an abbreviated form of notice is prescribed for investments regarding small businesses, i.e., those with gross assets
of less than $2 million and fewer than one hundred employees. 95
Following receipt of notice, the Agency sends a certificate
back to the investor, provided that the notice is complete, 96 and
forwards the notice to the Minister. After Agency consultation with
interested provincial governments, 97 the Minister either makes a
recommendation 9 8 or advises the investor of his right to make further representations to the Agency. 99 During its review of the
notice, the Agency will try to obtain undertakings' 0 0 from the investor to bring even more benefit to Canada than he had represented in his notice. If further representations are called for, the
tion of any technology or "know-how" used by the seller, and any special business
agreements that he (the investor) has with any affiliates in Canada. Regulations, supra note 50, Schedule II § 12; Id. Schedule I, Part II, § 1(1)(g)(iv).
Section 14 of the FIRA provides that information passed on during the review
process is confidential. Yet one problem is evident: an investor may back out intentionally or otherwise from a deal, after notice has been filed, i.e., after he has legally
obtained inside information of a competitor/would-be seller. See Grivakes, FIRA: Experiences of Canadian Lawyers, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS

IN CANADA 20 (A.B.A. 1976).
95. Regulations, supra note 50, § 6. This addition was very significant as, based
on Review Agency records from April 9, 1974, to March 31, 1978, 65% of reviewable
acquisition applications and 97% of reviewable new business applications fell within
the small business definition. [1977-78] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 17. For

such small businesses, the entire review process takes only about 15 days. Id. For investment targets not within the small business exemption, the review process takes
up'to an average of 90 days. Id. See notes 101-02 infra and accompanying text.
96. FIRA, supra note 5, § 8(4). Some notices may require further information
before they can be certified as complete. See G. HUGHES, supra note 5, at 64.
97. Section 9(b) of the Act allows submissions to be made by any party to the
proposed investment. While third party submissions (i.e., made by persons not party
to the investment) are not permitted under the Act, such submissions are in practice
accepted by the Agency. Address by Andr6 Dorais to Columbia Univ. Law School
Society of Int'l Law (March 18, 1980). See also Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 5,
at 213. Consultation may therefore be had with several groups of persons.
98. FIRA, supra note 5, § 10. If upon receipt of the Minister's recommendation
the Federal Cabinet is still uncertain of what action to take it may order the Minister
to proceed as if he had taken the "further representation" route all along. Id. § 12(2).
See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
99. FIRA, supra note 5, § 11(1). The investor then has 30 days in which to
make further representations. Id. § 11(2). Failure to do so does not result in automatic disallowance of the investment proposal, but in such a situation disallowance
would most probably be the outcome.
100. Undertakings are promises made by the investor with regard to the manner in which he will conduct the business being acquired or established.
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Agency will continue its negotiations with the investor, but will be
in an even stronger bargaining position because the investor has
been alerted to possible rejection of his proposal.
The length of the review process is restricted by the FIRA. If
within sixty days of receipt of notice by the Agency no final decision is made by the Cabinet, the investment proposal is deemed to
have been approved. 10 1 This time limit is excepted, however, if,
before the deadline, the Minister calls for further representations. 102
C.

Remedies For Violation of the FIRA
When an investor seeks to evade the review process, the Minister has a broad array of remedies. First, the Minister is empowered to launch an extensive investigation to determine whether the
FIRA is being violated.10 3 He can subpoena witnesses and business
records and has access to business premises in furtherance of the
investigation. 10 4 Where no notice has been given but the Minister
has reasonable grounds to believe that an investment has been or
10 5
is about to be made, he may demand that notice be given.
Where the investor has received Cabinet approval of his investment but is operating his business under conditions materially different from his undertakings, 10 6 the Minister may obtain a court
0 7
order directing compliance with the undertakings.'
101. FIRA, supra note 5, § 13(1). This occurred 38 times in 1974-77. After Two
Years, supra note 55, at 179 n.150.
102. FIRA, supra note 5, 13(1). This exception practically eliminates the 60-day
rule.
103. As reported in Agency Annual Reports from 1974 to 1979, over 950 investigations have been launched, leading to 105 demands for notice under § 8(3). See
note 105 infra and accompanying text.
104. FIRA, supra note 5, §§ 15, 16, 17. Any person who knowingly hinders an
investigation may be punished by up to 6 months in jail and a fine of $5,000. Id. §
26(a).
105. Id. § 8(3). Knowing failure to file notice may be punished by a fine of up
to $5,000, while defiance of a demand for notice is punishable by up to 6 months in
jail and a $10,000 fine. Id. § 24(1), (2). See also § 27 for liability of corporations
evading the FIRA.
106. The Surveillance and Enforcement Section of the Review Agency acts as a
watchdog and presently monitors over 850 businesses to see that undertakings are
complied with. [1978-79] FOR. INv. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 16.

107. FIRA, supra note 5, § 21. Violation of such an order is punishable as contempt of court. Id. § 22. If failure to comply with undertakings is the result of
changed market conditions, a flexibile approach would be taken and a court order
would not be sought. Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 5, at 212 n.90.
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The Minister may choose to take somewhat more forceful action in response to evasions of the FIRA. Under section 19, he
may apply for a court injunction to prevent the transaction from
taking place or, where it has already taken place, restrict the actions that the investor can take in relation to the business. 10 8 The
Minister may also apply for a court order rendering a transaction
nugatory. 10 9 Under such an order, the court may direct disposition
by the investor of any shares or property acquired, and revoke or
suspend any voting rights attached to the acquired shares. 1 10
Where the investor is outside of Canada and refuses to divest as
under the order, the court may vest the shares or property in a
trustee named by it. The trustee shall then dispose of the property
and return the proceeds to the investor-after deduction for trustee fees." 1
IV.

CASE HISTORY UNDER THE FIRA
Since the FIRA came into force in 1974, investors seem to
have accepted the review process as a way of life. The Minister has
rarely needed to resort to his statutory remedies 1 2 to ensure compliance with the Act. Most disputes that have arisen have been
solved by withdrawal of the proposal or by settlement after the review process. On thirty occasions, proposals which were rejected at
the conclusion of the review process were revised, re-presented,
and approved after a second review process.113
Not until 1979 was court action called upon to solve a dispute.
The first case, Attorney General of Canada v. Fallbridge Holdings
Ltd. ,114 involved two corporations that owned separate portions of
the Ambassador Bridge between Windsor, Ontario, and Detroit,
Michigan. The Canadian Transit Corporation, a Canadian corporation, owned the Canadian portion of the bridge, while a United
States corporation, Detroit International Bridge Company, owned
108.

FIRA, supra note 5, § 19.

109.

Id. § 20(1).

110.
hardship
111.
112.

Id. § 20(2). The FIRA attempts, where possible, to avoid causing undue
to third parties under nugatory orders. See id. § 20(1), (2).
FIRA, supra note 5, § 20(3).
See notes 103-11 supra and accompanying text, for enumeration of statu-

tory remedies.
113.

[1978-79] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 1 (Supp. 1979).

114. 7 Business Law Reports (Carswell) 275 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1979). See Can.
Current Law, Feb. 1980, 976.
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the Michigan portion of the bridge as well as all the shares of Canadian Transit. Central Cartage Company, a United States corporation, owned 24.6% of Detroit International. Under a plan between
Central Cartage and Fallbridge Holdings Ltd., a Canadian corporation, a reorganization of Detroit International was to take place
after which control of the Canadian side would go to Fallbridge
and control of the Michigan side would go to Central Cartage. In
keeping with this plan, Fallbridge acquired 24.9% of the shares of
Detroit International in March 1979.
At this point, the Attorney General of Canada applied to a Canadian federal court on behalf of the Minister for an injunction under section 19 of the FIRA, seeking to freeze the Detroit International stock held by Central Cartage and Fallbridge, and to bar
Fallbridge from acquiring any shares of Canadian Transit. The
Minister believed that: (1) Fallbridge and Central Cartage were
acting in concert, as a "group"; 115 (2) Central Cartage was an NEP
and therefore, the group itself was tainted as an NEP under section 8 of the FIRA; 1 1 (3) the group was acquiring control of Canadian Transit, a Canadian business enterprise. 117 The Attorney General argued that without an injunction, the Minister would be
deprived of a chance to decide whether to apply for a nugatory order under section 20 of the FIRA.
The court granted the injunction, holding that the transaction
came within the FIRA. 118 In addition, a Michigan court ordered
the Canadian federal court's order to be complied with as a matter
of comity of nations. 119 Despite the court orders, however, Central
Cartage followed through on its reorganization, without further
participation by Fallbridge. When the Attorney General moved for
the federal court to sequester the Canadian revenues of the Ambassador Bridge, Central Cartage reached an out-of-court agree0
ment with the Review Agency, ending the dispute. 12
115. FIRA, supra note 5, §§ 3(1), 3(6)(b), 3(7)(a).
116. See note 55 supra.
117. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
118. 7 B.L.R. at 279-80. The injunction applied until July 31, 1979, or until the
allowance of the investment by the Cabinet, whichever was earlier, and was later extended when the Cabinet had not rendered a decision on the application filed under
the FIRA. Annot., 7 B.L.R. 276 (1980).
119. Luptak v. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., No. 79-924948-CZ (Cir. Ct., Wayne Co.,
Mich., July 30, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction). See Annot., 7 B.L.R. 276

(1980).
120.

Annot., 7 B.L.R. 276 (1980).
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Fallbridge Holdings, besides being the first case to consider
the enforcement provisions of the FIRA, is significant for other reasons. The court stated that its order was not intended to have extraterritorial effect but was confined to where Central Cartage's activities would be in Canada or have an impact on Canada.' 2 1 The
substance of this ruling, however, is that Canada will sometimes
claim jurisdiction where a transaction covered by the FIRA takes
place outside Canada. The Canadian courts will attempt to direct
action by foreigners in foreign countries where there is an impact
22
on Canada. 1
The extent to which Canada will attempt to stretch the
precedental value of Falibridge Holdings is unclear. Further case
law must point out the direction. 123 Fallbridge Holdings demonstrates, however, that effective extraterritorial enforcement may be
difficult. 124
V. EFFECT OF THE FIRA
In its first five years of existence, the Foreign Investment Review Agency received 2,089 investment proposals, approximately
fifty-five per cent for takeovers and forty-five per cent for establishment of new businesses. 125 Of the 1,910 applications that were resolved, 1,613 were allowed, 136 were disallowed, and 161 were
121. 7 B.L.R. at 281. It should be noted that courts in the United States assert
jurisdiction in similar situations. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
122. Annot., 7 B.L.R. 276 (1980). The case is also significant for its interpretation of "acquisition of control." Fallbridge and Central Cartage were said to have acquired control of Canadian Transit through purchase of shares of Detroit International, a Michigan corporation which did no business in Canada but which owned all
the shares of Canadian Transit. Thus control was acquired through purchase of
shares of a foreign corporation, a result not specifically provided for in the FIRA but
possible under a liberal interpretation of § 3(6)(h). See notes 61, 65 supra and accompanying text.
123. In June 1980 a second court decision examined the FIRA, and held that
acquisition of control of a foreign parent may be subject to the review process, even
though it takes place outside Canada. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Attorney General of
Canada, No. T-1176-80 (Can. Fed. Ct. June 10, 1980). See FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY Q.
REP., Apr.-June 1980, at 3-4. For the present, it would seem that FallbridgeHoldings
is a viable precedent.
124. In future litigation, constitutional challenges could possibly be raised as
well as jurisdictional arguments. For discussion of the constitutionality of the FIRA,
see E. Arnett, Canadian Regulation of Foreign Investment: the Legal Parameters, 50
CAN. BAR REV. 213, 229 (1972).

125.

[1978-79] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 1 (Supp. 1979).
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withdrawn by investors before the review process was completed.' 26 The vast majority of proposals have been made by
United States investors-approximately sixty per cent. 12 7 One half
of all takeover proposals involved a target company that was cur28
rently foreign controlled.1
The effect of the FIRA is very difficult to measure. First, as
Canada itself has stressed repeatedly, the Act was not intended to
discourage foreign investment per se. 1 2 9 Second, the FIRA does
not apply to most expansions of previously existing foreign direct

investment, which accounts for at least eighty per cent of total for-

eign direct investment in Canada. 130 Third, portfolio investments
recently have assumed a much larger role in Canadian financing
and foreign direct investment has declined in relative importance
in the last decade. 131 Fourth, as the Review Agency has stated, the
impact of the FIRA on investment is minor when compared to the
influence of worldwide economic pressures and business trends. 132
Nevertheless, it can be said with certainty that the FIRA has
not discouraged businesses from investment in Canada. While
passage of the Act may have intimidated many investors initially,
economic indicators show that Canada remains an attractive market.1 33 Significantly, the number of investment proposals submitted
126. Id. Since only about 40% of the withdrawals were made because of probable rejections, id., the percentage of proposals directly prevented under the FIRA is
about 11%. Thirteen per cent of takeover proposals have been prevented while 9%
of new business proposals have been prevented. [1978-79] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY
ANN. REP. 29.
127. Gherson, supra note 1, at 14. There has been absolutely no discrimination
against United States investors in favor of other foreign investors. The figures for
United States takeover proposals are: 578 allowed, 61 disallowed, 49 withdrawn. The
figures for other takeover proposals are: 285 allowed, 29 disallowed, 31 withdrawn
(compiled from annual FIRA reports, 1974-79). If there is any anti-United States element in the Review Act, it is only because such a large portion of "foreign" investment is United States investment.
128. The Cabinet is more likely to allow a takeover of a business controlled by
foreigners than it would be regarding a takeover of a Canadian-controlled business
(compiled from annual FIRA reports, 1974-79).
129. "The Act was not intended to alter significantly the quantity of foreign investment entering Canada. What it was intended to do . . . is to improve the quality
of [foreign direct investment]." [1975-76] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 25 (emphasis in original).
130. See An Attempt To Harmonize, supra note 29, at 298.
131. [1976-77] FoRs. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 25. "[In terms of total investment in Canada [the FIRA] is insignificant." Id.
132. [1975-76] FOR. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 25.
133. E.g., Canada's volume of world trade continues to soar. From 1975-79, ex-
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to the Review Agency has increased every year, from 230 in 197475 to 454 in 1976-77 to 818 in 1978-79.134
It should also be noted in examining the effect of the FIRA
after five years that the Canadian government has a different attitude towards foreign investment than it did several years ago. Perhaps in response to a slow economic recovery in 1974-76' 5 and to
fears caused by the secessionist movement in Quebec, Canada's
distrust of foreign direct investment has abated. 136 Opinion swung
so much that it was rumored in late 1977 that Prime Minister
1 37
Trudeau was considering a temporary suspension of the FIRA.
While the FIRA, then, has not intimidated any of Canada's
trade partners, neither has it removed any of the problems pointed
to in the early 1970's by the proponents of the Act.' 38 For example, the Report of the Science Council to Canada on March 23,
1979, complained that Canada had no native base of technological
expertise, that the development of many firms was stunted by foreign parent dominance.' 39 Many other of the excesses that were
complained of years ago are still continued.
While its achievement record might not appear very impressive at first glance,' 4 0 the FIRA cannot be said to be a total failure.

ports grew from US$34.1 billion to US$55.5 billion, while imports increased from
US$36.3 billion to US$55.1 billion. PRESIDENT'S ECON. REP., app. B, at 322 (1980).

From 1973-79, Canadian exports to and imports from the U.S. have both increased by
approximately 115%. See id. at 319.
134. The figures are compiled from FIRA annual reports, 1974-79.
135. See Brown, Recent Tax Developments and Issues Affecting CanadaUnited States TransnationalBusiness Activities, 2 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 132 (1979).
136. See, e.g., Malcolm, Ontario Welcoming Concerns From U.S., N.Y. Times,

Dec. 3, 1978, at A17, col. 1. One telling figure is that the Cabinet from 1976-79
rejected less than half the percentage of proposals that it rejected in 1974-76 (compiled from FIRA annual reports, 1974-79). See, e.g., Brown, supra note 135, at 133.
137. Trumbull, Canadians' Warmth Toward U.S. Growing, N.Y. Times, Nov.
28, 1977, at A5, col. 1. This report was never officially confirmed and the suspension
was never ordered.
138. See notes 27-38 supra and accompanying text.
139. Giniger, Canadian Industry Draws Fire In Study, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1979, at D27, col. 1. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
140. Some criticize the high percentage of approvals made by the Cabinet, and
say that the FIRA is simply not tough enough. E.g., J. Edward Broadbent, a leader of
the opposition to Prime Minister Trudeau, charged in 1979 that the Review Agency
had become nothing more than a statistical clearinghouse for foreign takeovers. He
said that the Agency was in fact "hiding the continual selling out of Canada."
Giniger, Canadians' Equity Goal A Failure?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1979, at D10,

col. 3.
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As the amount of reviewable transactions is very limited, progress
under the Act is bound to be very gradual. Furthermore, gains
have been made. As a result of the review process, the Agency has
negotiated many concessions to Canadian interests that might not
have been made otherwise. The Agency, in its five year report, indicates that the greatest impact of the review process has been in
increasing the autonomy of Canadian subsidiaries. 14 1 Frequently,
for example, non-North American investors have given exclusive
rights to Canadian subsidiaries to service the entire North American market. 142 Undertakings 143 have been made that bring in the
whole range of significant benefits under the FIRA. In approximately sixty per cent of approved proposals, investors have
undertaken to process natural resources in Canada that are taken
from Canadian territory.' 44 In most cases, undertakings have also
been made to purchase a significant portion of goods and services,
used as input, from Canadian sources. 145 In sum, the Review
Agency can point to many cases in which an investor has pledged
to allow Canadians a fuller share in the business operations of a foreign controlled company. It is likely that the presence of the FIRA
has caused some foreign investors, both new and existing investors
entrenched in Canada, to consider Canadian needs and to look
46
upon subsidiaries in a different light.1
Unfortunately, progress of a case by case nature and changes
in the attitude of some foreign investors has not so far met the expectations of Canadians who hoped for noticeable aggregate improvements. The Review Agency itself does not claim that the
FIRA has had its desired result. 14 7 Perhaps one way that such a re141. [1978-79] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 2 (Supp. 1979). Other commentators believe that there has been a noticeable change in foreign parent behavior
toward.the Canadian subsidiary. One noted:
In the not too distant past in many American firms, there had been a tendency to view Canadian subsidiaries as, in effect, branches of American firms
and to deal with them organizationally on that basis. Now, there is a tendency to treat Canadian subsidiaries as separate and distinct entities ....
King, Recent Tax Developments and Issues Affecting Canada-United States
Transnational Business Operations: Introductory Remarks, 2 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 130
(1979).
142. [1978-79] FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 7 (Supp. 1979).
143. See note 100 supra.
144.

[1978-791 FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 7 (Supp. 1979).

145.
146.
147.

Id.
See, e.g., note 141 supra.
The Agency, however, does claim some progress. One encouraging statis-
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sult could be achieved is for the Canadian Parliament to enact additional legislation 48 that goes beyond where the FIRA begins.
CONCLUSION

Although the FIRA has been in effect for several years, Canadian participation in the economy is not nearly as great as the Canadian government would like it to be. 149 While the FIRA has led
to piecemeal progress and has not damaged Canada's international
trade relationships, problems with foreign control still exist. The
majority of foreign investors are not within the coverage of the
FIRA, and thus continue their past practices.
The FIRA, therefore, has not proven to be the definitive solution to Canada's foreign investment troubles. Additional legislation,
perhaps covering the operation of firms already controlled by
foreigners, is required before the goals of the early 1970's can be
realized.
Barry J. O'Sullivan
tic pointed to is that from 1970 tQ 1977 the level of Canadian control of Canadian industry has increased by 4% in the manufacturing sector and by 18% in the mining
industry. FOR. INV. REV., Spring 1980, at 2.
148. Supplementary legislation has already been passed. Most significant is an
amendment to the Combines Act, 1974-75-76 Can. Stat., c. 76, which decreed that
where a judgment of a foreign court or order of foreign government can be implemented in Canada by Canadian companies, and the implementation thereof would
adversely affect competition in Canada or otherwise restrain Canadian commerce,
then such implementation shall be limited or even barred. Id. § 31.5. This amendment addressed the concern of Canadians caused by legislation such as the United
States Trading With The Enemy Act. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. In
addition, the Canada Business Corporations Act has been amended, 1974-75-76 Can.
Stat., c. 33, to require that a majority of directors of companies incorporated in Canada be residents of Canada. Id. § 100(3).
In addition, it has been proposed in the 1980 session of Parliament that the
FIRA be amended. The amendments suggested would require that major acquisition
proposals by foreign companies be publicized prior to a government decision on
their allowance or disallowance. In conjunction with the publication, the Canadian
government would back up Canadian companies bidding against the foreign investors for control of the target business. See FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY Q. REP., Apr.-June
1980, at 1. This amendment would encourage Canadians to buy back control of their
home industries. It can safely be predicted that, given the existence of alternative
bids by Canadian interests, significantly fewer foreign direct investment proposals
would be accepted under the FIRA. See note 81 supra.
149. The government's general industrial policy still stresses the need to
strengthen Canadian participation in and expand Canadian control of the economy.
See FOR. INV. REV. AGENCY Q. REP., Apr.-June 1980, at 1.

